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I Dig It, But Congress Shouldn’t Let Me:
Closing the IDGT Loophole
Daniel L. Ricks, Irvine, California*
Editor’s Note: This article is the first-place winner of the
2010 Mary Moers Wenig Student Writing Competition.
By combining three tools that independently are beneficial to
taxpayers, clever estate planners have devised a transaction—the
installment sale of discounted assets to an intentionally defective
grantor trust—that saves their ultra-wealthy clients millions of
dollars in estate and gift taxes. This transaction, which is a foundational part of many estate plans, takes advantage of rules that
Congress never intended to be used in this way. Because the
Internal Revenue Service has conceded its inability to challenge
the transaction based on current law, any solution lies with Congress. This Article proposes an amendment to § 2036 that
would close the hole in the transfer tax base by eliminating taxpayers’ ability to form intentionally defective grantor trusts. Because this simple, targeted proposal leaves intact nearly all of
current law, it could be adopted quickly as an interim solution in
anticipation of fundamental tax reform.
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INTRODUCTION
If our transfer tax system is to be taken seriously, Congress must
address certain cracks in the tax law that have allowed billions of dollars
to escape the income tax and transfer tax bases.1 This Article synthesizes three interrelated but distinct estate planning tools used to exploit
those cracks: the intentionally defective grantor trust (or IDGT, pronounced “I dig it”), the installment sale, and asset valuation discounts.2
Part I describes the current benefits of these three tools, which independently are valuable to taxpayers. Part I then shows, through a
1 Throughout this Article, I use the terms “estate and gift tax” interchangeably with
the term “transfer tax.” I use both terms to refer to Subtitle B of the Internal Revenue
Code, which includes chapters 11–15.
2 The value of these tools depends on the applicable estate tax rate and exemption
amount, both of which have varied considerably in the recent past. In 2009, the highest
transfer tax rate was 45% and the effective exemption was $3.5 million for estate taxes
and $1 million for gift taxes. The estate tax was temporarily repealed for individuals
dying in 2010. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001) (EGTRRA). Under the recent tax legislation passed in December 2010, the highest transfer tax rate is currently 35%, with an effective estate tax
and gift tax exemption of $5 million. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312 (2010 Tax Act). While the 2010
Tax Act reinstated the estate tax for individuals dying in 2010, it also provided that estates of decedents dying in 2010 might make an election to be subject to carryover basis
rather than federal estate tax, as enacted in EGTRRA. In 2013, transfer taxes will return
to their pre-EGTRRA levels, with a top rate of 55% and an effective exemption of $1
million. Because more individuals will be subject to the estate tax in 2013 and thereafter
than in 2004–2012 , see I.R.C. § 2010(c), these tools will increase in value in those future
years.
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detailed example, how the three tools have been combined in one particularly effective estate planning transaction: an installment sale of discounted assets to an IDGT. Throughout this Article, I refer to this as
the “ISTIDGT” (installment sale to intentionally defective grantor
trust) transaction. Of the strategies used by estate planners for their
wealthy clients, this ISTIDGT transaction is one of the most important,
as it provides enormous potential income tax and transfer tax savings.
The ISTIDGT transaction is antithetical to a transfer tax system
and Congress never intended that the tax law would sanction such a
transaction. In fact, many estate planners believe that the unintended
tax benefits created by the Internal Revenue Code in favor of society’s
wealthiest individuals provide low-hanging fruit for federal revenue generation.3 However, because the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has decided over recent years that it has no authority to challenge taxpayer use
of IDGTs, it is Congress that must provide the solution through legislation.4 To that end, Part II outlines several reform proposals and recommends one specific amendment through which Congress might address
the statutory loophole by eliminating IDGTs as a tax-planning tool.
I. THE ISTIDGT TRANSACTION
To analyze the tax-planning strategy behind the ISTIDGT transaction, the tax treatment of the transaction’s three basic components must
be viewed in sequence. In this Part, I survey the transaction’s three basic components: IDGTs in Part I.A, installment sales in Part I.B, and
valuation discounts in Part I.C. Because each component by itself is a
powerful estate planning tool, I analyze each first as an independent,
isolated strategy. I then discuss the components together as part of the
larger ISTIDGT transaction. Part I.D provides a concrete example to
illustrate the potential tax savings generated by the technique.

3 See, e.g., T. Randolph Harris, IDGT’s—When Defective Is Effective 16 (May 12,
2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (“The estate planning benefit of almost any trust can be enhanced by structuring it as an IDGT. These techniques are so
taxpayer friendly that it is very likely that they will not last forever. However, unless and
until Congress takes action to the contrary, the IRS has conceded that it has no basis on
which to challenge their use.”).
4 In advocating reform, I am neither intentionally endorsing, nor denouncing, a
system that taxes wealth transfers. Rather, I believe that because a transfer tax system
repeatedly has been judged desirable by Congress, the Internal Revenue Code should
reflect that judgment. Therefore, Congress should embrace any reform that protects the
chosen tax base against transactions that thwart congressional intent.
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A. Intentionally Defective Grantor Trusts
This Section first outlines the statutory landscape that allows taxpayers to create IDGTs. It then discusses the benefits achieved by taxpayers who exploit the mismatch between the estate tax’s and the
income tax’s definition of a complete transfer.
1. Defining the IDGT Loophole
Congress originally enacted I.R.C. §§ 671–677,5 the grantor trust
rules, to prevent high-income individuals from shifting income by transferring assets to a trust of which lower-income family members are beneficiaries. Specifically, the rules target transfers to trusts where it
appears a grantor has not given up to the trust or its beneficiaries the
underlying economic control or benefit. A grantor trust for income tax
purposes results when a grantor transfers assets to a trust but retains
one or more of the powers listed in §§ 671–677. Such transfers are
treated for income tax purposes as a nonevent, since the grantor is required to pay all income taxes on the trust income as if the trust assets
belonged to her.6 Because grantor trust status was originally something
to be avoided, a trust that “flunks” the grantor trust rules is known as a
“defective” grantor trust. Thus, when a grantor intentionally retains a
power over transferred assets that will trigger grantor trust status, the
trust is known as an “intentionally defective grantor trust,” or IDGT.
For several reasons independent of the grantor trust rules, income
shifting is no longer a matter of great concern.7 However, because the
grantor trust rules remain in place, estate planners have discovered ways
to use the rules in their clients’ favor. The key to the IDGT taxplanning strategy is the misalignment between the grantor trust rules’
and the estate tax’s treatment of transfers to trusts. Not all retained
powers listed in the grantor trust rules will cause trust assets to be included in the grantor’s estate at death under §§ 2036–2038. An IDGT,
therefore, is an irrevocable trust which is structured to be a grantor trust
5 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to a “section” or “sections” are to the
Internal Revenue Code.
6 I.R.C. § 671. The grantor is also allowed to claim the deductions and credits generated by the grantor trust’s income. Id.
7 First, the income tax rate structure has become much more compressed than it
was when the grantor trust rules were enacted. (The top marginal rate is now 35%,
whereas it was previously as high as 91%. See I.R.C. § 1(a), (i).) Second, nearly all trust
income is taxed at the highest marginal rate applicable to individuals. I.R.C. § 1(e).
Third, parents no longer can take advantage of their young children’s lower tax rates,
since the Code taxes most unearned income of children under age fourteen at the highest
marginal rate of the parents. I.R.C. § 1(g).
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for income tax purposes, a transfer to which, however, is deemed a complete transfer for estate and gift tax purposes.8
Before discussing the tax benefits of such a trust, this subsection
describes two of the most important powers used by estate planners to
create IDGTs: §§ 675(4)(C) and 675(2).9 Each of these powers triggers
grantor trust status but does not trigger ultimate estate tax inclusion.
Section 675(4)(C) states:
The grantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a
trust in respect of which . . . [a] power of administration is exercisable in a nonfiduciary capacity by any person without the
approval or consent of any person in a fiduciary capacity. For
purposes of this paragraph, the term “power of administration”
means . . . [a] power to reacquire the trust corpus by substituting other property of an equivalent value.10
Thus, a grantor can form a grantor trust by specifying in trust documentation that she unilaterally will be able to remove trust assets and substitute property of equal value. This grantor trust–creating power does not
constitute any right to “the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to
the income from, the property, or the right . . . to designate the persons
who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom,”11 nor
any right “to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate [the transfer],”12 nor
any other right that would cause inclusion under the estate tax rules.
Therefore, because the retained power to substitute property of equal
value will not cause estate inclusion but will cause the application of
grantor trust rules, such a trust qualifies as an IDGT. Such treatment
has been blessed by the Service.13
8

JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS CONPRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL: PART ONE—INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX AND ESTATE AND GIFT TAX PROVISIONS, JCS-2-09, at 147 (Sept.
2009) (“A trust that is structured such that the grantor is treated as the owner for income
tax purposes, but not for gift or estate tax purposes, is sometimes referred to as an ‘intentionally defective grantor trust.’”). Under 26 C.F.R. § 25.2511-2(b) (2010), a gift is complete when the donor has given up “dominion and control” over the property.
9 Estate planners typically use multiple powers to create an IDGT, since the IRS
does not want to encourage IDGTs and therefore tends not to bless the effectiveness of
specific powers in creating grantor trusts. The IRS now simply refuses to issue private
letter rulings in many cases.
10 I.R.C. § 675(4)(C).
11 I.R.C. § 2036(a).
12 I.R.C. § 2038(a).
13 In Jordahl v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 92 (1975), the Tax Court stated that retention
of a § 675(4)(C) power will not cause estate tax inclusion. But in PLR 200603040 (Oct.
24, 2005), the IRS interpreted the Jordahl protection as limited to powers exercisable
only in a fiduciary capacity. This created a problem for practitioners, because the statute
is explicit that this particular power must be exercisable in a nonfiduciary capacity in
TAINED IN THE
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Section 675(2) states:
The grantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a
trust in respect of which . . . [a] power exercisable by the grantor or a nonadverse party, or both, enables the grantor to borrow the corpus or income, directly or indirectly, without
adequate interest or without adequate security.14
Although some practitioners worry that this power may be sufficient to
cause estate tax inclusion when the grantor or her spouse is named as
the trustee,15 naming some third party as the trustee—someone who is a
nonadverse party—should eliminate the possibility of inclusion in the
gross estate.16
Other retained powers, though less common, may also be used to
create a defective grantor trust.17
2. The Benefits of Using an IDGT
The primary benefit of an IDGT is that the income taxes paid on
IDGT income escape transfer taxation. By using an IDGT, an individual can transfer the beneficial interest in property to others, removing
that property from her gross estate. But because an IDGT is disregarded for income tax purposes, any taxes on the trust’s income must be
paid by the grantor. Because those taxes are not paid out of the trust
corpus, payment of the trust’s income tax by the grantor is effectively a
tax-free gift to the trust (and ultimately to the trust’s beneficiaries).18
order to get the grantor trust status. However, in a recent ruling, the IRS held that the
§ 675(4)(C) powers, even when exercisable in a nonfiduciary capacity, will not result in
causing the trust assets to be includible in the grantor’s gross estate on account of that
retained power. Rev. Rul 2008-22 C.B. 796; see also PLR 200944002 (July 15, 2009)
(holding that when a grantor trust is prohibited from reimbursing the grantor for income
taxes paid, Rev. Rul. 2008-22 C.B. 796 will apply and that there will be no estate tax
inclusion (despite Rev. Rul. 2004-64 C.B. 7, which many had interpreted to indicate
otherwise)).
14 I.R.C. § 675(2).
15 See Harris, supra note 3, at 10; Ronald D. Aucutt, Installment Sales to Grantor
Trusts, BUSINESS ENTITIES (Mar.-Apr. 2002).
16 Thomas C. Baird, A Potpourri of Leveraged Transfers Using Defective Grantor
Trusts, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS (July 2001). Limiting the power to
borrow without adequate security (and not allowing the grantor to borrow without adequate interest) should also raise fewer eyebrows at the IRS. Aucutt, supra note 15.
17 E.g., I.R.C. § 674(a) (power of disposition held by grantor or nonadverse party);
I.R.C. § 674(b)(5) (power to add beneficiaries); I.R.C. § 677(a) (power of nonadverse
party to distribute income to grantor’s spouse); I.R.C. § 673(a) (grantor holds reversionary interest in either corpus or income, worth at least 5% of entire corpus value).
18 Rev. Rul. 04-64, 2004-2 C.B. 7 (“When the grantor of a trust, who is treated as the
owner of the trust under subpart E [the grantor trust rules], pays the income tax attributable to the inclusion of the trust’s income in the grantor’s taxable income, the grantor is
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Another fundamental benefit of an IDGT—a benefit that exists for
any complete transfer of property and thus is not unique to IDGTs19—is
that it freezes the value of the taxpayer’s assets for transfer tax purposes. Although a gift tax return must be filed for any gratuitous transfer to an IDGT, the transferred property’s future appreciation is not
subject to estate or gift tax. Furthermore, any gift tax paid on the initial
gift will reduce further the grantor’s taxable estate.
These two benefits, combined with other minor benefits,20 make an
IDGT a powerful estate planning device even when all trust property is
transferred subject to gift tax. The next Section discusses how installment sales can drastically reduce gift tax liability while preserving the
IDGT benefits.
B. Installment Sales
In this Section, I first view installment sales in isolation, outlining
the primary tax benefit of installment sales generally along with a discussion of their primary downsides as an estate planning tool. Second, I
show that when combined with an IDGT, an installment sale can be
enormously beneficial to taxpayers. An ISTIDGT transaction eliminates the downsides associated with a typical installment sale.
1. Installment Sales Generally
An installment sale occurs when a seller transfers property to a
buyer in exchange for a series of future payments, which may extend
not treated as making a gift of the amount of the tax to the trust beneficiaries.”); see also
supra note 13 and accompanying text.
19 While this benefit may seem unremarkable since nearly all taxable gifts receive
the same treatment, this benefit is a prerequisite for the use of IDGTs. Without estate
tax exclusion of the trust’s appreciation, all other benefits are essentially worthless.
20 One additional benefit is potential income tax savings for the grantor. Individuals
reach the highest marginal tax rate for any income over $125,000 ($250,000 for married
individuals filing joint returns), while trusts are taxed at an equivalent rate for any income over $7,500. I.R.C. §§ 1(a), (d), (e). Thus, for grantors with IDGT income in excess of $7,500 but with overall personal income less than $125,000, the trust income will
be taxed at a lower rate than it would have been within a trust separate from the grantor.
Another benefit is an IDGT’s reversibility. Although the trust must be irrevocable—were the grantor to retain a right to revoke the trust, it would be includible in her
estate under § 2038—its grantor trust status can be turned off in some cases. If the trust
generates more income than the grantor can afford to pay income tax on, the grantor
may renounce whatever power or powers produced grantor trust status. For example, the
grantor may simply give up her right to substitute equivalent property in an IDGT based
solely on § 675(4)(C). In such a case, the grantor will no longer be liable for the trust’s
income tax liability. Although the trust is no longer an IDGT, and related benefits will
cease, the transition triggers no transfer tax liability, since the trust remains outside the
grantor’s estate.

R
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over several years. Installment sales are respected by the IRS as arm’slength transactions (which generate no gift tax) as long as the buyer
pays the fair market value for the property, which includes an interest
charge equal to the applicable federal rate (AFR).21 Although the benefit of avoiding gift tax can be substantial, the technique is useful as an
estate planning device only in situations where the transferred assets
appreciate at a rate higher than the AFR.
In a typical installment sale done for estate planning purposes, a
parent will sell directly to her child assets with appreciation potential.
The child then becomes the obligor on a balloon note under which
AFR-based interest must be paid to the parent annually and principal
must be repaid upon the note’s expiration. Any appreciation in the
transferred assets that exceeds the AFR will be economically equivalent
to a tax-free gift to the child.
The beneficial tax treatment of installment sales is mitigated somewhat by two factors. First, the annual interest payments must be reported as the seller’s (parent’s) taxable income and taxed at ordinary
income rates.22 Typically in the estate planning context, the buyer
(child) has no offsetting interest deduction on the sale. Second, the sale
triggers the recognition of gain in the transferred assets—no carryover
basis is permitted.23 Therefore, in the above example, the parent would
have been taxed on any pre-transfer appreciation, if any, that previously
had gone untaxed. Although in many cases the taxpayer may elect to
report the gain under the installment method—ratably over the time
period of the installment sale24—in practice the installment method has
several limitations that are particularly salient in the context of estate
planning.25

21 As long as the seller in an installment sale charges interest equal to the appropriate AFR, the sale will not be treated under § 7872 as a below-market loan. Pursuant to
§ 1274(d), the IRS calculates the various AFRs (short-term, mid-term, and long-term
rates) each month and publishes them in a revenue ruling.
22 I.R.C. § 453.
23 I.R.C. §§ 453, 1001, 1011. In comparison, had the child received the assets upon
the parent’s death, the gain would have gone completely unrecognized. I.R.C. § 1014.
24 I.R.C. § 453.
25 A taxpayer may not use the installment method to report gain on marketable
securities—the gain is taxed immediately upon the sale. I.R.C. § 453(e). If the taxpayer
realizes a gain on any transferred depreciable assets, this gain will trigger immediate taxation under the recapture rules under §§ 1245 and 1250. I.R.C. § 453(i)(1). And if the
installment obligation exceeds $150,000, an additional tax must be paid to reflect the
deferral of tax allowed by the installment method. I.R.C. § 453A(b).
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2. Installment Sales to an IDGT
As a result of a 1985 revenue ruling, the tax treatment of an
ISTIDGT transaction is much more beneficial than the treatment of a
general installment sale. In Rev. Rul. 85-13, the IRS held that any exchange between a grantor and a grantor trust is not a taxable event,
since the grantor trust is not a separate taxpayer.26 This means that the
installment sale triggers no gain recognition27 and that interest payments made by the trust to the grantor are not taxable.28
Even though the ISTIDGT transaction has no income tax consequences, it is still respected for estate tax purposes, resulting in removal
of the transferred property from the grantor’s gross estate.29 Although
the principal is returned to the grantor’s gross estate upon the note’s
maturation, this treatment of installment sales to IDGTs has the effect
of freezing the value of the assets in the grantor’s estate; any appreciation above the AFR will pass to the trust’s beneficiaries without being
subject to any transfer tax. A further benefit of installment sales to
IDGTs is that the grantor can reacquire with cash the appreciated assets
without triggering income tax on the capital gain.30
26 Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184. See Part II.B.1 for a discussion of Rothstein v.
United States, 735 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1984), and the IRS’s legal reasoning in Rev. Rul. 8513, 1985-1 C.B. 184.
27 Because no gain is recognized, § 453’s installment method is completely inapplicable to the transaction. Likewise inapplicable are the limitations regarding marketable
securities, recapture for depreciable assets, and sales exceeding $150,000. See supra note
25.
28 Of course, the grantor still must pay tax on any income or capital gains generated
by the trust.
29 In the event that the grantor dies before repayment of the principal on the installment note, the principal value of the note will be includable in the grantor’s estate. However, the income tax consequences in such a situation—whether the grantor would
recognize taxable income in the amount of gain attributable to the unpaid principal on
the note—are unclear. Jonathan G. Blattmachr, et al., Income Tax Effects of Termination
of Grantor Trust Status by Reason of the Grantor’s Death, 97 J. TAX’N 149 (Sept. 2002);
Louis A. Mezzullo, Freezing Techniques: Installment Sales to Grantor Trusts, 2000 ABA
PROB. & PROP. MAG. available at http://www.abanet.org/rppt/publications/magazine/
2000/jf00mezzullo.html; see also Harris, supra note 3, at 15 (arguing that any remaining
principal payments after death would have no income tax consequences as a result of
Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184).
30 Rev. Rul. 85-13. Once again, the transaction is a nonevent. Such a reacquisition
can be particularly useful for terminally ill grantors; although the grantor will take a
carryover basis in the asset upon reacquisition, the appreciated asset will receive a
stepped-up basis in the hands of the grantor’s heirs upon her death. I.R.C. § 1014. On
the other hand, if the appreciated asset had remained in the trust, the IDGT’s beneficiaries would not receive a similar basis step-up. I.R.C. § 1015. Note that if one of the
grantor trust–triggering powers is the § 675(4)(C) power to substitute property of equal
value, then the grantor can substitute cash for appreciated trust assets even without trustee permission, unless state law dictates otherwise.
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In order to illustrate the benefit of leverage in ISTIDGT transactions, the installment sale process must be explained. First, the grantor
sets up an IDGT and funds it through a taxable gift to the trust of at
least 10% of the value of the property to be transferred in the installment sale. This initial funding ensures that the trust is economically legitimate and respected for estate tax purposes.31 The grantor then
enters into an installment sale with the IDGT. The grantor sells assets
with appreciation potential in exchange for a balloon note.32 The IDGT
pays annual interest on the note equal to the AFR and then repays the
principal when the note matures (often after 9 years33). Because the
note has an interest rate equal to the AFR, the transaction is deemed to
be for full value and no gift tax must be paid.
The grantor can magnify the tax savings of an IDGT through repeated use of installment sales to the same IDGT, using any remaining
cash or assets from one completed sale as the 10% guarantee for a subsequent sale.34 Assuming that the assets transferred through the installment sale appreciate at a rate greater than the AFR, then installment
sales of increasing size can be made over time. These repeated transactions over multiple decades allow substantial transfers out of the grantor’s estate with only a small initial taxable gift.

31 This initial funding guards against the risk that the installment sale transaction
will be disregarded as a sham transaction. If the IDGT does not have a cash reserve out
of which to make future interest payments and relies alone on the income generated by
the asset, then the IRS may be able to argue that the grantor has retained an income
interest in the trust and may try to use § 2036(a)(1) to include the entire trust in the
grantor’s estate. Therefore, many practitioners argue that before an installment sale, an
IDGT should contain assets worth at least 10% of the amount of the installment note.
E.g., Baird, supra note 16; see, e.g., PLR 9535026 (May 31, 1995). Furthermore, the entire
trust—not just the assets subject to the installment note—should be liable to pay the
installment note, and the payment of interest and the repayment of principal on the note
should have no direct ties to the amount of income generated by the assets sold to the
trust under the installment method. Cf. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, 356 U.S.
274 (1958).
32 Sometimes the trust begins to pay back principal before the end of the note term.
But I describe a more aggressive case, where interest only is paid during the lifetime of
the installment sale note.
33 The midterm AFR is for instruments with a term of between 3 and 9 years. The
long-term AFR, for instruments with a term of greater than 9 years, is typically higher
than the midterm AFR. Instruments often have a term of 9 years to get the benefit of the
lower rate for as long as possible.
34 It may be unnecessary to wait until one installment sale has terminated before
engaging in another. One practitioner writes that a new installment sale can be entered
each year, using all excess cash within the trust as the 10% seed money necessary for the
sale. Steven J. Oshins, Sales to Grantor Trusts: Exponential Leverage Using Multiple
Installment Sales, PROB. & PROP., Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 48-50.
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The primary assumption that drives the success of an ISTIDGT
transaction is that the trust assets will appreciate at a rate greater than
the AFR.35 This same assumption drives other estate planning devices,
including the grantor retained annuity trust.36 However, if the AFR reflects a risk-free market rate of interest, then it is essentially impossible
for a taxpayer (without illegally trading on inside information) to choose
investments that consistently generate an investment return greater than
the AFR. It would thus seem that an ISTIDGT transaction would be
appropriate only for individuals willing to take some market risk.
The next Section shows that with various valuation discounts, an
asset’s return on investment will often exceed the AFR. As a result, the
ISTIDGT transaction can be an attractive estate planning tool even for
conservative clients with low risk tolerance.
C. Valuation Discounts
This Section demonstrates the estate planning benefits derived
from valuation discounts on certain types of assets. It then shows how
picking the right type of asset for an ISTIDGT transaction can increase
the chances that the asset’s investment return exceeds the required interest payments on the installment note.
1. Valuation Discounts Generally
Valuation discounts enable individuals to pay lower transfer taxes
than they would otherwise. For example, assume a wealthy mother intends to transfer to her son an asset worth $1 million. Assuming that the
mother has already exhausted her annual exclusion with respect to her
35 The tax treatment of an ISTIDGT transaction essentially allows an IDGT to borrow from the grantor the necessary funds to purchase an asset that is projected to grow at
a faster rate than the annual interest payments, which are set at the AFR.
36 A grantor retained annuity trust (GRAT) is a trust which pays the grantor a specific annuity amount for the fixed term of the trust and which distributes any assets remaining in the trust at the end of the term to the trust’s beneficiaries (often the grantor’s
children). The amount of the reportable gift is the actuarial value of the remainder interest passing to the beneficiaries, which is equivalent to the total initial GRAT corpus less
the present value of the scheduled annuity payments to the grantor. Thus, if the grantor
reserves an annuity stream that, based on the § 7520 rate (which is 120% of the AFR), is
projected to exhaust the GRAT’s assets by the end of the term, the beneficiaries’ interest
will be valued at zero and the GRAT will generate no taxable gift. However, if the assets
held by this “zeroed-out” GRAT outperform the § 7520 rate, then all the annuity payments will be satisfied and the beneficiaries will receive the assets remaining in the
GRAT even when the GRAT generated no taxable gift. In 2000, the Tax Court blessed
taxpayers’ ability to create a zeroed-out GRAT. See Walton v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 589
(2000). Unlike ISTIDGT transactions, zeroed-out GRATs are already on Congress’s radar. In the previous Congress, the House passed a bill that would have prevented taxpayers from creating zeroed-out GRATs. See H.R. 4849, 111th Cong. (passed Mar. 24, 2010).
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son37 and that she has made previous lifetime gifts such that any additional gift will be taxed at the highest marginal gift tax rate,38 this gift
would generate a gift tax liability in 2011 of $350,000. However, if she
can find some applicable valuation discount that will cause the transferred asset to be valued at $600,000 for gift tax purposes, then she can
reduce her gift tax liability to only $210,000.
The two most important valuation discounts are the lack-of-control
discount and the lack-of-marketability discount.39
The lack-of-control, or minority, discount would be triggered, for
example, when a parent transfers to her son 30% of the shares of a
closely held corporation while the parent retains the remaining 70% of
the business that she founded years ago. While the fair market value of
the business may be $10 million, the 30% interest in the hands of the son
will be valued at less than $3 million to account for his lack of influence
and control in directing the affairs of the business.
This same example likely would also trigger the lack-ofmarketability discount. Because the closely held business is not traded
on a public exchange, the son’s 30% interest would be valued at less
than $3 million to account for the lack of a ready market.
Together, the lack-of-control and lack-of-marketability discounts
can create an overall discount of up to 50% for some assets.40 In many
cases, such as the legitimate, closely held business described above, such
discounts are entirely justified, as they reflect the true economic value of
the assets. However, taxpayers have exploited the valuation discount
regime to create discounts where none should exist. For example, a father may form a family limited partnership (FLP) that holds as assets
solely $10 million in marketable securities. He may then claim lack-ofcontrol and lack-of-marketability discounts when he gives FLP interests
to his children. Perhaps surprisingly, the gift tax law on such a transaction is clear: The FLP interests are entitled to substantial discounts. Indeed, the Tax Court has acquiesced almost entirely in allowing steep
valuation discounts for FLP assets, even when the FLP is not engaged in
37 I.R.C. § 2503(b) (allowing a grantor to give up to $13,000 each year to a given
donee without any gift tax consequences).
38 Pursuant to § 2505, the first $5,000,000 in taxable gifts during a taxpayer’s lifetime
will generate no tax liability. And under the current rate tables, all gifts beyond the
lifetime exclusion are taxed at a marginal gift tax rate of 35%. See I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2502.
39 Other commonly used discounts include the blockage discount, the fractionalinterest discount, the key-person discount, the built-in capital gains discount, and the
restricted-stock discount.
40 See Laura E. Cunningham, Remember the Alamo: The IRS Needs Ammunition in
its Fight Against the FLP, 86 TAX NOTES 1461 (2000); Cut Your Estate Taxes in Half,
FORBES, Oct. 19, 1998. Typical discounts accepted by the IRS are in the range of
25–40%.
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an active business but holds solely marketable securities.41 Thus, by taking the simple step of placing securities in an FLP rather than giving the
securities to his children outright, the father can reduce drastically his
gift tax liability on the transfer of the same underlying assets, essentially
making his wealth disappear to the federal government.42
2. Valuation Discounts Used in ISTIDGT Transactions
In order for an ISTIDGT transaction to be respected as generating
no gift tax, the IDGT must pay the grantor fair market value for the
assets transferred, which includes paying an interest rate at least as high
as the AFR. However, a grantor would prefer to receive as little as
possible from the IDGT in return for the transferred assets, because
anything remaining in the IDGT after the repayment of the installment
note will have passed to the trust’s beneficiaries with no transfer tax
liability. Valuation discounts enable such a result.
Assume that a parent uses an installment sale to sell FLP interests
worth $10 million to an IDGT, whose beneficiaries are her children.43
The parent hires an appraiser who values the FLP interests at $6 million,
a 40% discount that reflects the assets’ lack of control and lack of marketability. In exchange for the interests, the IDGT will transfer to the
parent an installment note worth $6 million plus interest equal to the
AFR. At the end of the nine-year installment term, the IDGT will be
required to transfer $6 million to the grantor. Even if the underlying
$10 million in assets held by the FLP produces a slightly negative overall
investment return over the term of the note, the IDGT in the children’s
hands will still hold assets worth more than $2 million after the interest
and principal have been paid to the grantor on the installment sale.44
41 See, e.g., Miller v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2009-119; Pierre v. Comm’r, 133 T.C. No.
2 (2009).
42 See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 40.
43 “[T]he perfect asset for [an IDGT] is an asset that produces cash flow and either
can be transferred currently at a discount or will appreciate significantly.” Kuno S. Bell,
Use Defective Grantor Trusts for an Effective Triple Play, 75 TAX STRATEGIES 12–19
(July 2005).
44 In order to avoid the possibility of paying future gift tax upon the IRS’s revaluation of transferred assets, one commentator recommends using a value definition clause
such as “% of LP interest equal in value to $X.” Baird, supra note 16. If the interest has
been undervalued and the IRS fails to challenge the valuation, then the trust will have
received an even greater transfer tax savings. If the IRS does challenge the undervaluation, then under the formula, the excess partnership interests could revert to the grantor
who will have no gift tax liability as a result. Alternatively, the installment sale contract
could include a formula whereby any such excess interests, that would otherwise trigger
gift tax, would be transferred to charity. In such a case, an IRS revaluation might even
result in a higher gift tax deduction on the income tax return for the year of the original
transfer. See Estate of Petter v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2009-280.
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D. Example: An ISTIDGT Transaction Using Discounted Assets
In this Section, I provide an example of an ISTIDGT transaction to
quantify the benefits that a wealthy taxpayer can achieve at the federal
government’s expense.
In June 2009,45 an unmarried grantor establishes a trust with her
grandchildren named as beneficiaries and with a trusted financial advisor as the trustee. The trust qualifies as an IDGT because the grantor
retains the right to substitute assets of equivalent value (§ 675(4)(C))
and because the trust can sprinkle income and principal on the beneficiaries in the complete discretion of the trustee (§ 674(a)). The grantor
funds the trust with an initial cash gift of $1,000,000,46 a gift that she will
report on a gift tax return but for which she will pay no gift tax as this is
the first taxable gift made during her lifetime.47
Several years earlier, the grantor had established an FLP and
funded it with marketable securities now worth $100,000,000. In October 2009, the grantor makes an installment sale to the IDGT of a 15%
interest in the FLP, and the interest is appraised at a fair market value
of $10,000,000, due to lack-of-control and lack-of-marketability discounts. In exchange for the partnership interest, the grantor receives
from the trust a nine-year note with face value of $10,000,000 and an
annual interest rate of 2.66% (the midterm AFR for Oct. 2009).48
Over the course of the nine-year note, the assets in the trust (initially worth $16,000,000, including the $15,000,000 in underlying FLP assets and the initial $1,000,000 in cash contributed to the trust) earn 8%
annually.49 Each year, the note pays interest to the grantor in the
amount of $266,000. Over nine years, a total of $2,394,000 is paid to the
grantor in interest. The grantor also pays annual income tax on the
45 For ease of illustration, this example assumes that 2009 law has been extended
indefinitely into the future, and it ignores the changes to estate and gift tax law in 2010 by
EGTRRA, in 2011-12 by the 2010 Tax Act, and in 2013 by the sunset of EGTRRA and
the 2010 Tax Act. See supra note 2.
46 See supra note 31. The $1,000,000 cash in the trust ensures that the trust can
make its annual interest payments. If the trust relies solely on income produced by the
asset to make interest payments on the note, the IRS may have a better argument for
including the annual income stream in the grantor’s estate under § 2036(a)(1). See
Oshins, supra note 34, at 48.
47 See supra note 38. I have omitted discussion of the generation-skipping transfer
(GST) tax consequences because I assume that there will be no GST liability. I assume
that the grantor will allocate $1,000,000 of her GST exemption such that the inclusion
ratio will be zero and no GST tax liability will ever result from this trust. See I.R.C.
§§ 2010, 2601, 2611, 2631, 2632, 2642.
48 Rev. Rul. 09-33, 2009-40 I.R.B. 447.
49 The FLP earns 8% annually, which is distributed to the partners, including the
IDGT. The liquid assets held by the IDGT likewise earn 8% annually. All of the earnings, less the annual interest payments, are reinvested and earn a return of 8%.
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trust’s earnings, for a total of $1,900,000 over nine years.50 In October
2018, at the end of nine years, the trust assets are worth $28,700,000
($15,000,000 of which remains in the FLP and $13,700,000 of which is
held in separate marketable securities). The principal amount of the
note, $10,000,000, is paid off, leaving $18,700,000 in the trust ($3,700,000
of marketable securities and $15,000,000 of FLP assets). Then, in 2019,
the grantor dies unexpectedly, leaving her entire estate to her children.
By utilizing the installment sale to the IDGT of her limited partnership interest, and by paying income tax on the trust’s income, the grantor has decreased her gross estate by $19,600,000 ($18,700,000 remaining
in the trust, minus the initial $1,000,000 gift, plus the $1,900,000 in income taxes paid) with no gift tax consequences. Assuming an estate tax
rate of 45%, this amounts to over $8,800,000 in saved estate taxes that
the grantor’s decedents otherwise would not have received. And since
no gift tax was paid on the initial $1,000,000 gift that funded the IDGT,
the grantor has succeeded in passing over $20,000,000 to her family
members without anyone paying a dime in transfer taxes.
The following table shows the estate tax savings (in millions) given
various growth rates of the trust’s underlying assets.
Growth
Rate

Income Tax
Paid

Value Passing
Through Trust

Total Decrease in
Gross Estate

Estate Tax
Savings

5%

$2.06

$10.89

$12.95

$5.83

8%

$1.90

$17.66

$19.56

$8.80

10%

$6.34

$23.12

$29.46

$13.25

15%

$12.54

$40.82

$53.36

$24.01

20%

$21.36

$66.02

$87.38

$39.32

The tax benefits in this example are, in many cases, understated.
First of all, if the grantor had been married, the initial seed money
could have been $2,000,000 (through gift splitting) without generating
any tax liability. Or if our grantor had been willing to pay $4,050,000 in
gift taxes, she could have made an initial gift to the trust of $10,000,000.
In either case, the trust could have purchased a larger asset through the
installment sale, and the tax savings would thus be multiplied.
Second, the grantor could have exercised her § 675(4)(C) right to
reacquire the limited partnership assets, and her children would then
50 I assume that over the entire nine-year period, all assets are subject to an income
tax rate of 15% for both capital gains and dividends. Alternatively, if all the income were
taxed at a 35% rate, the income tax liability over nine years would be $4,430,000. In
either case, the entire amount would be equivalent to a tax-free gift from the grantor,
who pays the tax, to her grandchildren.
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have received those assets with a step-up in basis at her death in 2019.
The appreciation on those assets would go untaxed (as it would have
been had no trust been used at all), for a further income tax savings of
potentially several million dollars.
Third, this example has focused only on federal taxes. Not only
may state income taxes on the IDGT income further reduce the grantor’s gross estate, but a reduction in the size of the grantor’s gross estate
also may lead to a reduction in state death taxes.51
Lastly, this example has assumed that the grantor dies shortly after
settling the installment note. However, a grantor could leverage the
same IDGT for multiple installment sales and further tax savings. Had
our grantor not died, then she could have used the $18,700,000 remaining in the IDGT as the seed money for a new installment sale. This
time, she would be able to sell assets to the IDGT worth as much as
$187,000,000.52 With this use of multiple ISTIDGT transactions, the
benefits of IDGTs over several years can be enormous.
*

*

*

This Part has shown that a grantor can, with fairly low risk, drastically reduce the size of her gross estate through the use of installment
sales to an IDGT. Although the IRS has never explicitly blessed the
technique, it has conceded that it has little power to challenge it (aside
from contesting the value of the assets sold).53 Part II proposes a legislative solution to the tax dodging engaged in by America’s super
wealthy.
II. ELIMINATING

THE

ISTIDGT TRANSACTION

The most obvious solution to the tax planning described in Part I is
simply the elimination of all IDGTs. In Part II.A, I propose that instead
of full harmonization of the transfer tax and income tax laws, and instead of reform of the grantor trust rules, Congress should merely
51 Many states have an estate tax that is tied to the schedules for the federal credit
for state death taxes that existed under prior law. In these “coupled” states, the state will
collect revenue in an amount equal to the credit allowable on the federal estate tax return
under § 2011(a). Because Congress repealed the state death tax credit in 2001, these
coupled states currently collect no death tax revenue under their pick-up tax.
Decoupled states are those which base their estate tax on something other than the
federal credit, such as the grantor’s gross estate. Even though there is no current federal
state death tax credit, these states nonetheless collect estate taxes. Thus, a decedent in a
decoupled state will pay greater aggregate estate taxes than a decedent in a coupled state.
A reduction in the grantor’s estate therefore would result in a reduction in state estate
taxes in decoupled states.
52 See supra notes 31, 46, and accompanying text.
53 See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
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amend the estate tax law to provide that any transfer that is incomplete
for income tax purposes will also be incomplete for estate tax purposes.
The primary virtue of my proposal, which would eliminate taxpayers’
ability to form IDGTs, is that it could be enacted quickly and without
extensively reforming estate tax or income tax law. In Part II.B, I
briefly suggest two alternative solutions that would not eliminate IDGTs
but would diminish their advantages under current law.
A. Primary Proposal: Eliminate IDGTs Without Fundamental Tax
Reform
Any proposal to eliminate IDGT formation must focus on three
systems of taxation, each of which potentially treats a transfer to a trust
in one of two ways, based on whether the transfer is complete. For income tax purposes, a transfer to a trust may or may not establish a grantor trust. For gift tax purposes, a transfer to a trust may or may not be a
completed gift. For estate tax purposes, a transfer to a trust may or may
not be pulled back into the transferor’s gross estate.
In order to analyze the various proposals, this Section uses the following table, which describes the possible tax results for any given transfer to a trust.54
Complete Gift;
No Inclusion in
Gross Estate

Incomplete Gift;
Inclusion in
Gross Estate

Complete Gift;
Inclusion in
Gross Estate

Grantor Trust

Scenario 1

Scenario 3

Scenario 5

Non-grantor Trust

Scenario 2

Scenario 4

Scenario 6

Although in a certain sense, any given transfer is either complete or
incomplete, the three systems of tax produce six55 separate possible scenarios because the tax systems are not coordinated. “By mere coincidence, they sometimes function in unison; other times, they do not.”56
54 I recognize that some transfers are “split gifts” where a portion is a complete gift
and the other portion is not. However, I ignore such gifts for purposes of this paper,
focusing on the basic treatment of various transfers. Ultimately, the analysis of “split
gifts” would not change my conclusions regarding the applicable scenarios.
55 Theoretically, the table could list two additional possible scenarios: transfers
treated as incomplete gifts but which are not pulled back into the gross estate and which
are made either to (1) a grantor trust or (2) a non-grantor trust. But under current law,
these scenarios are nonexistent—any transfer that is complete for estate tax purposes is
also complete for gift tax purposes. Because such scenarios do not exist and because no
commentator advocates changing this rule (since it leads to no tax avoidance), I confine
my analysis to the six scenarios listed in the table.
56 Jay A. Soled, Reforming the Grantor Trust Rules, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 375,
418 (2001).
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Scenario 1 describes transfers to IDGTs—although a transfer is
complete for both gift tax and estate tax purposes, it is incomplete for
income tax purposes and results in a grantor trust. In order to eliminate
Scenario 1 transfers, either the transfer tax or the income tax laws, or
both, must be modified. This Section describes various possibilities for
IDGT-eliminating reform.
First, I discuss harmonization of the transfer tax and income tax
systems. Second, I discuss reform of the grantor trust rules’ definition of
completed transfer for income tax purposes. Finally, I conclude that
while harmonization or revision of the grantor trust rules may achieve
the elimination of IDGTs, a simpler solution is to draft rules merely
ensuring that the completed-transfer rules for estate tax purposes are
narrower than the completed-transfer rules for income tax purposes.
1. Harmonization?
A harmonized system would employ one single definition of completed transfer for income tax, gift tax, and estate tax purposes. Such a
system has intuitive appeal, since all three tax systems attempt to capture those transfers in which a grantor has not fully given up control
over the transferred property. Harmonization could be implemented by
replacing the current income tax definition (found in the grantor trust
rules) with the transfer tax definition,57 by replacing the transfer tax definition with the income tax definition, or by replacing both the income
tax and transfer tax definitions with an entirely new scheme.
The disjointed systems have caused confusion and tax planning opportunities, leading many commentators to recommend some form of
coordination or harmonization. One judge in 1940 stated that “the interrelation of the income, estate, and gift taxes presents many puzzling
problems which deserve the attention of Congress.”58 In 1942, Professor Erwin Griswold made this reform proposal:
The need is for provisions which would coordinate and harmonize the application of the income, estate, and gift taxes to
transfers and trusts. . . . [This] is based upon the general princi57 The proposal of Professor Robert Danforth does exactly this. He recommends
using the gift tax rules as the measure of a gift’s completeness for purpose of the grantor
trust rules. Robert T. Danforth, A Proposal for Integrating the Income and Transfer Taxation of Trusts, 18 VA. TAX REV. 545, 601-15 (1999). Danforth recommends replacing
§§ 673 through 677 with one single section, a new § 673, which triggers grantor trust status whenever a grantor makes an incomplete transfer and which states that, “for purposes
of this section, whether the grantor has made a completed transfer of an interest shall be
determined according to the rules applicable to [the federal gift tax rules, found in
§§ 2501–2524].”
58 Comm’r v. Prouty, 115 F.2d 331, 337 (1st Cir. 1940).
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ple that a person can escape income and estate tax with respect
to any property only by giving it away without qualification
and without the reservation of any interest in the property. If
he makes such an outright unqualified gift, he incurs a gift tax,
but is no longer subject to the income tax on the income from
the property, nor to the estate tax on the principal when he
dies. If, however, he makes a transfer which is anything short
of an outright unqualified gift, he pays no gift tax, but the income from the property remains taxable to him, and the property will be included in his gross estate on his death.59
Under harmonization, all transfers to trust would belong either to Scenario 2 (a complete transfer would be treated as complete under all
three tax systems) or to Scenario 3 (an incomplete transfer would be
treated as incomplete under all three tax systems).
Complete Gift;
No Inclusion in
Gross Estate

Incomplete Gift;
Inclusion in
Gross Estate

Complete Gift;
Inclusion in
Gross Estate

Grantor Trust

Scenario 1

Scenario 3

Scenario 5

Non-grantor Trust

Scenario 2

Scenario 4

Scenario 6

The primary virtue of harmonization, at least for purposes of this
Article, is that it eliminates the possibility of a Scenario 1 transfer. But
as a solution to the IDGT problem, harmonization is unnecessarily overbroad: In getting rid of Scenario 1, it also sweeps away three harmless
scenarios. Scenarios 4-6 are not prone to taxpayer abuse, since all three
require ultimate inclusion in a grantor/decedent’s gross estate of any
property transferred. The only differences between Scenarios 4–6 and
Scenario 3 (which would survive under harmonization) are whether gift
tax must be paid at the time of the transfer (as in Scenarios 5 and 6) and
whether the trust will have a separate identity for income tax purposes
(Scenarios 4 and 6).
Thus, although harmonization may be desirable for other reasons,60
other methods may be better targeted at eradicating IDGTs.
59 Erwin N. Griswold, A Plan for the Coordination of the Income, Estate, and Gift
Tax Provisions with Respect to Trusts and Other Transfers, 56 HARV. L. REV. 337, 342
(1942); accord Soled, supra note 56, at 418.
60 Harmonization has many merits outside of the narrow question of IDGT formation. Indeed, Professor Griswold was principally concerned about creating an efficient
tax system:
[The income tax, estate tax, and gift tax provisions relating to transfers and
trusts] have grown up almost independently, with the result that they are
worded differently and do not fit together in many important matters of detail.
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2. Reform of the Grantor Trust Rules?
Another method of abolishing Scenario 1 transfers is through reform of the grantor trust rules. Because taxpayers have turned grantor
trust status into a tool to be used against the IRS,61 several commentators have advocated revision of the grantor trust rules.62 Some have
even called for their repeal.63 Although I agree that for reasons larger
than just the IDGT problem, the grantor trust rules should be reformed,
I discuss in this subsection the use of grantor trust rule reform as a
method for eliminating IDGTs.
One way of addressing the IDGT problem would be to repeal the
particular rules most often used by taxpayers to form IDGTs. For exFurthermore, the courts have done some remarkable things, particularly under
the income tax, and it is far from clear just what effect these income tax decisions will be given in the estate and gift tax field. . . . The law as it now stands is
fully beyond the comprehension of any but experts, and the most that they can
do in many situations is to express doubts. An enormous amount of intricate
litigation has resulted. . . . It would seem clear that certainty to the taxpayer, and
efficiency in the administration of the tax laws, would be greatly improved if the
statute could be changed so as to minimize the present problems.
Griswold, supra note 59, at 338–39.
61 Although the grantor trust rules originally were designed to prevent income shifting, it is now nearly impossible for wealthy individuals to lower their income tax liability
by shifting their taxable income to a trust. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. For
this reason, one professor has noted that
[t]he rules regarding grantor trust status have become rules in search of a purpose and, one might think, relegated to a relic of a bygone era. But where
classification as a grantor trust was once to be avoided at all costs (hence their
common classification by practitioners and commentators alike as “defective
trusts”), taxpayers may now deliberately establish grantor trusts as a way to
minimize their income and transfer tax burdens. In short, taxpayers use as a
shield what was once a sword of the Internal Revenue Service . . . . This thwarts
congressional intent and leads to significant revenue losses.
Soled, supra note 56, at 377; accord Danforth, supra note 57, at 601. (“The grantor trust
rules in their present form are an anachronism.”)
Another professor comments that currently the principal effect of the grantor trust
rules “is to provide the taxpayer with an awesomely powerful avoidance tool. It is not a
matter of the cure being worse than the disease. It is, rather, that the cure has become
the disease.” Leo L. Schmolka, FLPs and GRATs: What To Do?, 2000 TAX NOTES TODAY 49-105, at ¶ 93.
62 E.g., John L. Peschel, The Impact of Fiduciary Standards on Federal Taxation of
Grantor Trusts: Illusion and Inconsistency, 1979 DUKE L.J. 709.
63 See Schmolka, supra note 61, at ¶ 93; Joseph M. Dodge, Simplifying Models for
the Income Taxation of Trusts and Estates, 14 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 127 (1997); see also
Sherwin Kamin, A Proposal for the Income Taxation of Trusts and Estates, Their Grantors, and Their Beneficiaries, 13 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 215 (1996).
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ample, Congress could easily repeal §§ 675(4)(c)64 and 675(2),65 which
are fairly artificial ways of creating grantor trusts. Such an ad hoc solution would require no coordination or harmonization of the income and
transfer tax systems. However, while “[i]t might then appear that further tinkering would be desirable, . . . the process could go on resulting
in ever increasing statutory complexity. On the whole it seems fairly
clear that the problem can be better handled by undertaking a new approach to the entire field.”66
A somewhat related solution, suggested above, is to repeal all, or
nearly all, of the grantor trust rules. Professor Jay Soled argues that
grantor trust status should only apply in two situations: (1)
when the terms of the trust require payments of trust property
to the grantor or grantor’s spouse or (2) when payments of
trust property can be made currently to the grantor or the
grantor’s spouse under a discretionary, revocation, or amendment power exercisable by the grantor or the grantor’s spouse,
whether acting alone or in conjunction with any other person.
This proposed definition of grantor trust status combines current Code §§ 676 and 677(a)(1), both of which were enacted
before the grantor trust rules. Their enactment and retention
under the proposal makes sense even today, because when the
grantor or the grantor’s spouse has direct access or use of trust
property, the grantor should be treated as having complete dominion and control over trust property and taxed
accordingly.67
Soled’s proposal would eliminate IDGTs, since any grantor trust created
under the new rules would be includible in the grantor’s estate under
§ 2036(a)(1). However, his proposal would require Congress to put
other rules in place to fill any holes left by the repealed grantor trust
rules.68 Thus, the repeal and partial replacement of the grantor trust
rules could occur only after substantial congressional study and debate.
64 See supra note 10 (describing the power of the grantor to substitute assets of
equal value).
65 See supra note 14 (describing the power of the grantor to borrow without adequate interest or security).
66 Griswold, supra note 59, at 342; see also Soled, supra note 56, at 414 n.206 (“The
encompassing nature of the grantor trust rules . . . remain[s] out of sync with the Code’s
current progressive rate structure and it is highly unlikely that mere tinkering with these
rules would result in a coordinated set of rules between the income and transfer tax
systems.”).
67 Soled, supra note 56, at 415.
68 Soled concedes, for example, that Congress would need to enact additional restrictions “to prevent a renewal of income-shifting between grantors and the trusts they
establish.” Id. at 416.
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3. Proposal: Modification of § 2036
While harmonization and reform of the grantor trust rules may be
desirable, they are both unnecessary to root out IDGTs. I propose in
this subsection a simple solution that would eliminate taxpayers’ ability
to form IDGTs but which would also leave intact nearly all of current
law.
Under my proposal, Congress should amend § 2036(a) by adding a
new paragraph (3) such that 2036(a) would read:
(a) General rule. The value of the gross estate shall include
the value of all property to the extent of any interest therein of
which the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in
case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration
in money or money’s worth), by trust or otherwise, under
which he has retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which
does not in fact end before his death—
(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property, or
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the
property or the income therefrom, or
(3) any power or right which would cause the decedent to
be deemed the owner of any portion of a trust under sections
671–677.
Congress would also create a new § 2036(c):69
(c) Grantor trusts. For purposes of subsection (a)(3), the decedent shall be deemed to have retained any ownership, power,
or right held by a third party that would cause the decedent to
be deemed the owner of any portion of a trust under sections
671–677.
Under this proposed rule, there would be no IDGT (Scenario 1) transfers; all grantor trust–generating transfers would result in ultimate inclusion in the grantor’s gross estate (i.e., Scenarios 3 and 5).70
69 Current § 2036(c) would become § 2036(d). Sections 671–677 contain various
provisions that trigger grantor trust status even when the grantor himself has retained no
power or right. The new § 2036(c) would ensure that no grantor trusts, even those triggered by powers held solely by a spouse or other third party, would escape estate tax
inclusion.
70 Unlike the harmonization proposals, this proposal would change nothing about
the gift tax system’s completed transfer rules. Thus, a transfer may cause grantor status
and may at the same time be deemed a completed gift. Such a transfer, labeled as Scenario 5, generates no gaming opportunities, because, in addition to the gift tax liability upon
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Scenario 3

Scenario 5

Non-grantor Trust

Scenario 2

Scenario 4

Scenario 6

Like harmonization, some transfers would be complete for both income and estate tax purposes (i.e., Scenario 2). But unlike harmonization, my proposal would leave untouched those transfers which, under
the present rules, are complete for income tax purposes (no grantor
trust is created) and incomplete for estate tax purposes (i.e., Scenarios 4
and 6).71 Whereas harmonization would result in one common
completed-transfer definition for income, estate, and gift tax systems,
my proposal would create a completed-transfer definition for the estate
tax system that is narrower than both the income tax and the gift tax.72
Some commentators might question my proposal because it fails to
achieve the efficiency and predictability of a harmonized system.
Others might object because it targets a well-functioning transfer tax
system and fails to cure the underlying IDGT-creating pathogen—the
grantor trust rules.73 Through the lens of tax policy, both concerns are
on the mark. However, because my proposal eliminates the gaming opportunities available with IDGTs but retains all other current income
and transfer tax laws understood by practitioners, it is much simpler—
and therefore easier to enact and implement—than either harmonization or reform of the grantor trust rules.74
Harmonization ultimately may be desirable, particularly if achieved
through reform of the grantor trust rules. But such reform, if it were
ever to occur, would undoubtedly involve extensive congressional debate. After all, both grantor trust rule reform and harmonization have
transfer, any post-transfer appreciation in the property will also be taxed at some point.
If the grantor trust–creating power remains attached to the property until the grantor’s
death, the appreciation will be subject to the estate tax. See I.R.C. §§ 2001(b), 2012. If
the retained power is given up before the grantor’s death, that action would generate a
gift tax for any portion of the gift not previously taxed.
71 These transfers, if they actually exist, should cause no immediate congressional
concern. See supra text accompanying notes 59–60.
72 Under current law, the estate tax rules already are narrower than the gift tax
rules. See supra note 55.
73 Cf. Danfoth, supra note 61, at 602 n.247 (“[T]axing the grantor’s income tax payments as gifts would address the transfer tax problem . . . , but it would fail to address an
even more fundamental problem: the present grantor trust rules are illogical and do not
comport with economic reality.”).
74 As Voltaire famously stated, “the perfect is the enemy of the good.” VOLTAIRE,
LA BÉGUEULE, CONTE MORAL A3 (1772).
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been unsuccessfully advocated by brilliant scholars and practitioners for
decades. Because my proposal is simple, targeted, and has little (if any)
downside, it should be enacted now as an interim fix to the particular
problem of IDGTs, even if more significant reform later eliminates
IDGTs in some other way.
B. Alternative Proposals: Eliminate Benefits of ISTIDGT
Transaction
Despite decades of proposals by noted academics and practitioners
to change fundamentally the grantor trust rules and to align income tax
and transfer tax principles, Congress has done nothing to prevent the
creation of IDGTs. Thus, this Section suggests two reforms that, unlike
my proposal in the previous Section, would not eliminate the ability of a
grantor to create an IDGT or to engage in an installment sale with an
IDGT. Nonetheless, either of the reforms would eliminate much of the
tax-planning benefit from ISTIDGT transactions. Although both of
these reforms likely would be more complex and less effective than my
proposal in Part II.A, either would be preferable to the status quo.
1. A Transaction Between a Grantor and a Grantor Trust Is a
Recognition Event
Rev. Rul. 85-13 is the primary authority giving rise to ISTIDGT
transactions. The ruling provides that a transaction, such as an installment sale, between a grantor and a grantor trust is not a taxable event.
The relevant issue in the ruling was this:
To the extent that a grantor is treated as the owner of a trust,
whether the trust will be recognized as a separate taxpayer capable of entering into a sales transaction with the grantor.75
The ruling discusses the Rothstein decision,76 in which the Second Circuit held that “although the grantor must be treated as the owner of the
trust, . . . the trust must continue to be viewed as a separate taxpayer.”77
The sale that occurred in that case between the grantor and the grantor
trust—the grantor’s transfer of an unsecured promissory note in exchange for the trust’s corpus—was deemed to be a recognition event
between the separate taxpayers in which the grantor acquired a cost basis in the assets.
The revenue ruling reaches the opposite conclusion on facts nearly
identical to those of Rothstein:
75
76
77

Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184.
Rothstein v. United States, 735 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1984).
Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184.
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[T]he transfer of trust assets to [the grantor in exchange for a
promissory note] was not a sale for federal income tax purposes and [the grantor] did not acquire a cost basis in those
assets.78
In deciding not to follow Rothstein, the IRS criticizes the Second Circuit’s reasoning:
It is anomalous to suggest that Congress, in enacting the grantor trust provisions of the Code, intended that the existence of
a trust would be ignored for purposes of attribution of income,
deduction, and credit, and yet, retain its vitality as a separate
entity capable of entering into a sales transaction with the
grantor. The reason for attributing items of income, deduction,
and credit to the grantor under section 671 is that, by exercising dominion and control over a trust, . . . the grantor has
treated the trust property as though it were the grantor’s
property.79
However, the IRS’s conclusion in Rev. Rul. 85-13 that a grantor
trust is not a separate entity capable of engaging in sales transactions
with the grantor is at odds with the IRS’s position that a grantor trust is
a separate entity for gift tax purposes. Section 7872 recharacterizes
below-market loans as arm’s-length transactions for purposes of both
income tax and gift tax.80 Because there is no gift tax rule equivalent to
Rev. Rul. 85-13 holding that there are no gift tax consequences in a
transaction between a grantor and a grantor trust, installment notes
from grantor trusts bear interest equal to the applicable federal rate in
order to avoid having the forgone interest being treated as an imputed
gift.81 In other words, the IRS treats a grantor and a grantor trust as
separate entities for gift tax purposes but not for income tax purposes.
Although the IRS could remedy this mismatch by withdrawing Rev.
Rul. 85-13 at any time, the IRS has subsequently affirmed the ruling,
deferring to Congress on the issue.82
78

Id.
Id.
80 Section 7872 explicitly states that it applies to the entire Internal Revenue
Code—Title 26 of the U.S. Code—and therefore to both the income tax and transfer tax
subtitles. I.R.C. § 7872(a)(1) (“For purposes of this title . . . .”). However, under the
IRS’s current approach to ISTIDGT transactions, the note’s characterization of income
and principal (pursuant to § 1274) is irrelevant for income tax purposes, since the interest
income is not taxable. Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184; PLR 9535026 (May 31, 1995).
81 See I.R.C. §§ 1274(d), 7872(f)(1)–(2).
82 The IRS has subsequently cited Rev. Rul. 85-13 to support its position that transactions between a grantor and a grantor trust have no significance for income tax purposes. See, e.g., PLR 200247006 (Aug. 9, 2002); PLR 200228019 (July 12, 2002); PLR
9535026 (May 31, 1995).
79
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Therefore, I recommend that Congress amend § 671 to provide that
a sale between a grantor and a grantor trust is a recognition event; after
all, the sale in nearly all cases is done at arm’s length and thus provides
sufficient realization of gains. Making the sale a recognition event
would ensure that any built-in gain in assets transferred to an IDGT
through an installment sale would be taxed. In order to prevent grantors from selectively triggering losses by transferring only those assets
with built-in losses, § 671 could also contain a new basis rule providing
that the grantor and the grantor trust will take a basis in their newly
acquired assets equal to the greater of the fair market value and the
carryover basis.83 While such a reform would add additional complexity
to the already undesirable grantor trust rules,84 it would remove the primary benefit of ISTIDGT transactions.85
2. Installment Notes Are Retained Interests
As long as a trust holds equity equal to at least 10% of the face
value of an owed installment note, the IRS is unlikely to challenge the
installment note as a retained interest for purposes of estate and gift
taxes.86 If Congress is unwilling to make the entire IDGT includable in
the grantor’s estate (as does my proposal in Part II.A), it should at least
pursue inclusion of the installment note by creating a new rule that
treats an installment note to a related party (including a grantor trust) as
a retained interest by the seller in the assets sold.87 This would gut the
asset-freeze strategy in ISTIDGT transactions, because under such a
rule, “only when the note is completely discharged would the seller be
deemed to have made a completed gift equal to the excess of the value
of the assets at that time over the amounts previously received on the
note.”88
83 In effect, the new provision would cause capital gains to be taxed immediately
and capital losses to be deferred until sold to an unrelated third party.
84 The reform would also add complexity to other parts of the Code. Congress
would need to cross-reference the new basis rule in other sections, such as § 1016.
85 The new recognition rule would not change the result from Rev. Rul. 85-13 that
interest payments made by the trust to the grantor are not taxable to the grantor. However, a rule providing for the recognition of the interest payments would be a wash, as the
rule most likely would result in an offsetting interest-paid deduction to the trust.
86 See PLR 9535026 (May 31, 1995).
87 Unlike the statutory grantor trust rules, the completed transfer rules for estate
and gift tax purposes are found mostly in regulations. Therefore, rather than drafting this
new rule directly into the Internal Revenue Code, Congress could pass legislation
directing the Treasury Department to implement the new rule by writing appropriate
regulations under the relevant Code sections, including 2036, 2512, 2701, and 2702.
88 Mitchell M. Gans & Jay A. Soled, Reforming the Gift Tax and Making It Enforceable, 87 B.U. L. REV. 759, 797 n.147 (2007) (“Consider the case of a taxpayer who sold a
$1 million piece of real estate to her daughter in return for a ten-year, $100,000 install-
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CONCLUSION
Transfer taxes are a sensitive topic on Capitol Hill and getting
transfer tax legislation through Congress is typically extremely difficult.89 But even if Congress continues this course of avoiding the most
important issues underlying our federal transfer tax system, it need not
avoid altogether legislating in the transfer tax area. Congress should
indicate its willingness to defend the transfer tax base by making a
quick, easy fix to the tax laws that currently allow taxpayers to avoid
taxes on large fortunes through IDGTs. Enactment of my proposal
would be such a fix.
Certainly there are several reforms beyond the scope of this Article
that would also make IDGTs less attractive to taxpayers. For example,
Congress could (and should) reform the valuation discount rules that
allow wealthy taxpayers to claim significant valuation discounts on liquid assets held in FLPs.90 However, pushing such a reform through
Congress may be as difficult as harmonization or reform of the grantor
trust rules. Although enactment of my proposal would not fix the fundamental problems that lie in the intersection of income taxes and transfer taxes, it is nonetheless attractive: By focusing on enforcing political
decisions that have been made and repeatedly reaffirmed in the past,
Congress could feasibly eliminate IDGTs and better protect the transfer
tax base while avoiding the larger, more sensitive, political issues surrounding transfer taxes generally. Fundamental tax reform will not occur overnight. But in the meantime, Congress should reach for the
low-hanging fruit and close the IDGT loophole.

ment note. By year ten, assume the value of the real estate had appreciated to $2.5
million; were that the case, in year ten, after the note had been satisfied, the taxpayer
would be deemed to have made a $1.5 million gift to her daughter (i.e., the excess of $2.5
million less the $1 million she received in payments).”).
89 The transfer tax provisions enacted as part of the 2010 Tax Act emerged only as
part of a final demand in negotiations that became a linchpin to passage of the entire Act.
90 E.g., Laura E. Cunningham, FLP Fix Must Be Part of Transfer Tax Reform, 112
TAX NOTES 937, 937 (Sept. 11, 2006).
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